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Abstract 
 
This essay discusses vigilante groups in relation to access for rights to security, particularly in Central Lombok District, 
West Nusa Tenggara Province. Vigilante groups are defined as 'informal security groups' to distinguish them from 
formal security entities owned by the state such as the police and military. I propose an alternative interpretation toward 
the existence of informal security groups that is different from mainstream explanation. Most of the literatures have a 
strong tendency to categorize informal security groups merely as antagonist actors and a predatory element in the 
process of democratization in Indonesia. By referencing Asef Bayat’s notion of social non-movement, I argue that 
informal security group, in Lombok particularly, is one way ordinary people seek to improve their quality of life when 
security and access to justice are not available, resulting in a blurred line between legal and illegal activity. However, 
these groups are susceptible to be used by the local elites to achieve particular political interests. This research used 
qualitative methods, including interviews and archival research.  
 
 
Kelompok Keamanan Informal Sebagai Bentuk Social Non-Movement di Indonesia:  
Kasus Buru Jejak di Lombok Tengah 
 
Abstrak 
 
Artikel berikut ini membahas tentang kelompok kekerasan dalam kaitannya dengan akses terhadap hak atas keamanan di 
Kabupaten Lombok Tengah, Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat. Kelompok kekerasan dalam artikel ini didefinisikan sebagai 
‘kelompok keamanan informal’ untuk membedakannya dengan entitas keamanan formal yang dimiliki oleh negara seperti 
polisi dan tentara. Saya menawarkan alternatif interpretasi yang berbeda dengan penjelasan yang sudah umum terhadap 
keberadaan kelompok kekerasan informal. Sebagian besar penelitian terdahulu cenderung menempatkan kelompok 
kekerasan informal hanya sebagai aktor antagonis atau elemen predatoris dalam proses demokratisasi. Dengan mengacu 
kepada konsep yang digagas oleh Asef Bayat tentang social non-movement, saya berargumen bahwa kelompok keamanan 
informal di Lombok merupakan cara orang-orang biasa untuk meningkatkan kualitas hidupnya ketika akses terhadap hak 
atas keamanan dan keadilan tidak tersedia, meskipun berada di antara batas aktivitas legal dan ilegal. Akan tetapi, 
kelompok-kelompok seperti itu rentan digunakan oleh elit lokal untuk memperoleh kepentingan politik tertentu. Penelitian 
ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan wawancara dan penelusuran arsip/dokumen. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“In the beginning we lost our sheep, but if we report to 
the police for our case, we will lose our motorcycle”, 
local humor in Central Lombok 
 
Article 3 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that everyone is entitled to security. The right to 
security is mentioned along with the right to live and to 
freedom. Therefore, it is clear that security is an 
absolute principle in human existence that must be 
upheld. Related to the right to security, Indonesia's 
transition from the authoritarian New Order regime to 
democratization and decentralization is characterized by 
instability and insecurity. The state no longer holds the 
sole monopoly over security: it appears that entities 
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outside the state use violence in the pursuit of security 
as a central characteristic of their existence. 
 
A topic that often arises in discussions about post-New 
Order security is the presence of groups and organizations 
that use violence to achieve their goals. These groups 
can be shaped by identity, such as ethnic-based and 
faith-based or political orientation, such as the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) task force (Masaki 
& Hamid, 2008). The most prominent examples for the 
ethnic-based and faith-based groups are Pecalang in 
Bali and Islamic Defender Front (FPI). Compared to the 
New Order period, the existence of these violent groups 
is increasingly significant in the contemporary public 
sphere.  
 
The Universal Periodic Review in 2008 and 2012 noted 
that violence against minorities that are often carried out 
by violence groups should be a major concern (Universal 
Periodic Review, 2008; 2012). Vigilante groups, especially 
faith-based ones such as the Islamic Defender Front 
(FPI), play prominent roles in the violence against and 
persecution of minorities. They are actively involved in 
acts of intolerance and violations of religious freedom. 
Minority groups such as the Ahmadiyah, Shia, and 
Christians have become targets of violence. 
 
Mainstream explanations for the emergence of these so-
called vigilante groups suggest that they are the 
consequence of political transition after the end of the 
New Order and democratization policies such as 
decentralization and implementation of local direct 
elections (Wilson, 2015; Hadiz, 2010). The leading 
explanations present them as predatory vigilante groups 
who seek economic resources and defense for their notions 
of morality. However, vigilante groups are a complex 
phenomenon throughout the Indonesian archipelago, and 
at this point, there is still no comprehensive explanation 
for them. Therefore, I would like to propose a different 
perspective to interpret the emergence and role of vigilante 
groups. This perspective is connected with access to 
security rights as one of the elements of human rights 
principles.   
 
In this essay, I will discuss the vigilante groups in 
relation to the access to rights to security, particularly in 
Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara Province. Vigilante 
groups are defined as 'informal security groups' to 
distinguish them from formal security entities owned by 
the state such as the police and military. By referencing 
Asef Bayat’s notion of social non-movement, I would 
like to emphasize the way ordinary people seek to 
improve their lives through these informal security 
groups who offer a more accessible type of security than 
does the state. This essay intends to address a question: 
how should we interpret the presence of informal 
security groups, such as Buru Jejak, in relation to the 
security needs of the Central Lombok society?  
In order to elaborate this position, this essay examines 
cases that occurred in Central Lombok, West Nusa 
Tenggara Province, using data from previous visit to 
this site. Lombok Island is widely known as an area that 
has large numbers of informal security groups compared 
to other regions in Indonesia (McDougall, 2007). These 
groups have a significant role in the local community. 
This is because they are not only involved in the security 
issues but are also influential in the area’s political and 
economic spheres. 
 
2. Methods 
 
This article is a part of an ongoing study on politics and 
crime in West Nusa Tenggara Province with several visits 
since 2012 until recently (2015). Multiple visits were 
done to assess the process of social change related to 
decentralization in the Indonesian outer island region that 
has a low human development index. One obstacle that 
appeared was access to key informants. It was because 
the topic is quite sensitive, thus requiring multiple visits 
during fieldwork to be able to build a strong network and 
a good relationship with the targeted informants. 
 
The methodological approach is qualitative. The primary 
resources were obtained from interviews with 26 
participants and a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) that 
involve five participants. The secondary resources include 
official documents and archives from agencies of the 
Central Lombok District Government, especially the 
statistical agency, regional election commission, and local 
police office. I also referred to local newspaper accounts. 
I conducted in-depth interviews with members of the 
public and key participants such as local government 
officials and religious leaders. Participation was purely 
voluntary. The interviews were semi-structured and 
conversational, focusing on the community’s knowledge 
toward crime, security, and the existence of informal 
security groups in Central Lombok. I used a local assistant 
to develop familiarity with the community.  
 
I have conducted the interviews in several stages. First, I 
conducted several semi-structured and informal interviews 
with six targeted participants, and a Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) with five participants, which consisted 
of experts on social and political issue, which included a 
lecturer in the University of Mataram, a civil society 
organization activist, and a journalist. These interviews 
could be characterized as academic discussions, rather 
than standard participant interviews, and I have already 
had connections with these people previously. They 
mostly live at Mataram, the capital of West Nusa 
Tenggara Province, which is located in Western Lombok.  
These discussions helped me to obtain scholarly opinion 
and background information for the case study. In these 
interviews, I obtained advice on cultural sensitivities in 
terms of contacting and meeting potential participants, as 
well as the names of potential participants. The second 
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stage involved semi-structured and informal interviews 
with 16 participants who live at Central Lombok. These 
participants included government officials, police officers, 
religious leaders, aristocrats, local politicians, and ordinary 
residents. The third stage will comprise in-depth interviews 
with four targeted figures who affiliate with informal 
security group such as its leaders and members.  
 
In general, I used snowball technique for participant 
recruitment through intermediaries from the network that 
I have already established. These intermediaries helped me 
obtain information on accommodation and transportation 
during the fieldwork period. I have made contact with 
participants from various backgrounds during my previous 
research visits. I started with approaching the most 
trustworthy and credible contacts in order to investigate 
potential participants and key participants. Through these 
individuals, I narrowed down and was introduced to 
targeted participants and key participants for the 
interviews.  
 
Participants in Stage 1 were chosen on the basis of their 
expertise on social and political issues in Central Lombok 
and/or their connection to the communities. Another 
consideration in selecting participants at his stage was 
their access to the data that I sought such as local 
newspaper archives and previous research files from the 
University of Mataram concerning Central Lombok. 
Participants in stage 2 were selected based on their 
knowledge of the issues related to the role of informal 
security groups. The participants came from various 
backgrounds. They were also individuals who had the 
authority to provide the data that I needed such as 
statistical data on the specific issue that released by the 
local government. This category of participant includes 
informal leaders and respected figures in the communities 
who helped me gain access to valuable information 
related to the political situation. Finally, there were also 
people who used the security service from informal 
security group.  Moreover, they opened the gate in order 
to give me greater familiarity with the communities. 
Stage 3 participants were chosen because of their 
involvement in the informal security groups.  
 
Data from primary and secondary resources is analyzed 
with triangulation technique. This technique is used to 
ensure the reliability of the data from multiple resources 
such as interviews, observations, and documents. 
Triangulation helped to identify the most convincing data 
because it would be re-examined and compared with 
other multiple sources. Therefore, the data is relatively 
valid and trustworthy. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
Theoretical Overview and Key Concepts. Mainstream 
explanations always categorize vigilante groups or 
organized violence, which have been mushrooming 
since the collapse of the New Order, as an antagonist 
and predatory actor in the democratization of Indonesia 
(Bakker, 2016; Wilson, 2015). The groups can adapt to 
the new political scheme to maximize the benefit of 
local resources as much as possible. I argue that most of 
the literatures categorize vigilante groups as part of the 
consequences of the political transition in 1998 and 
democratization practices such as decentralization. They 
adapt to the new political system to maximize the 
profits from predatory economic goals and defend 
political ideology expression such as syariah regulation 
(Kloos, 2014). They often legitimize themselves as a 
defender of local or regional interests (Bakker, 2015). 
 
For this paper, there are several types of vigilante 
groups and organized violence prominent in Post-New 
Order Indonesia public sphere either at the local level or 
national level. Those groups can be categorized into 
identity-based vigilante groups and community-based 
vigilante groups. The identity-based vigilante groups 
can be distinguished into two types: ethnic-based and 
faith-based. Groups that are classified into ethnic-based 
vigilante groups include the Betawi Brotherhood Forum 
or Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR) and Jawara (traditional 
thugs) in Banten Province; faith-based groups include 
the Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Islamic Defender Front). 
They use identity as a source of legitimacy for their 
existence.  
 
As an ethnic identity-based group, the Betawi people, 
members of FBR, are reclaiming political-economy 
resources from which they were previously marginalized. 
Members of the FBR use coercion, intimidation, and 
violence to obtain political rights and economic 
advantages. They try to control the informal financial 
sector by such tactics as securing a parking lot; 
collecting debt; security businesses, and protection for 
marketplaces (Brown & Wilson, 2007; Wilson, 2010). 
However, the case of jawara (thugs) in Banten Province 
is different. It is because they can also control formal 
politics. Chasan Sochib is the godfather of jawara in 
Banten Province. His family controls various important 
political positions in both the legislative and the 
executive branches of local government. His daughter, 
Ratu Atut, was Banten Governor before the Corruption 
Eradication Commission or Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi arrested her in 2013. Well-funded government 
projects often fall into hands of the family of Chasan 
Sochib (Masaki & Hamid, 2008).  
 
Meanwhile, faith-based violent groups, such as the 
Islamic Defender Front or Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 
have a more prominent role in channeling the 
expression of ideology based on Qur’an Edict for 
‘leading people toward good and away from evil’ 
(Wilson, 2006; Wilson, 2014). A radical interpretation 
of the Qur’an leads them to violent acts such as 
targeting nightclubs and religious minorities (Wilson, 
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2008). The FPI members attack religious minorities and 
groups they consider deviant under the pretext of the 
fatwa (legal opinion) issued by Indonesian Council of 
Muslim Scholars (MUI) (Woodward et al., 2014). They 
use the fatwa of the MUI as a way to legitimize the 
persecution act to the minority groups. Therefore, FPI 
can gain support mainly from conservative people in 
Indonesia. Also, it helps them avoid the label as 
terrorists (Woodward et al., 2014). 
 
The prominence of the faith-based violent groups such 
as FPI in the public sphere is in line with the analysis of 
scholars that capture the phenomenon of conservative turn 
in Indonesia. van Bruinessen (2013) interprets conservatism 
as an aspiration that reject modernist, liberal, or progressive 
re-interpretations of Islamic teachings with a strong 
commitment to establish orthodox doctrines in the society. 
The conservative interpretation of Islamic doctrine is 
well articulated in the public sphere through symbolic 
violence, such as hate speech, and also violent attack 
(Woodward et al., 2014). Thus, violation of religious 
freedom and tolerance easily occur, such as persecution 
of Ahmadiyya and Shia groups through controversial fatwa 
of MUI, sharia regulations that contain discrimination, 
and the emergence of radical Islamist groups in various 
regions in Indonesia (van Bruinessen, 2013; Burhani, 
2014).  
 
Furthermore, Menchik (2014) indicated that the continued 
violence toward religious minorities such as the Ahmadiyya 
was caused not only by conservative turn but also 
related to the design of Indonesian nationalism which he 
called with 'Godly Nationalism'. It means that an imagined 
community based on common or mainstream theism 
mobilized by the state in cooperation with religious 
organizations in the society (Menchik, 2014). Thus, with 
the conservatie turn and Godly Nationalism context, it is 
not surprising if FPI becomes very prominent, even 
though the number of its members is quite small when 
compared with the two major Islamic organization in 
Indonesia, namely NU and Muhammadiyah. In the end, 
Indonesian social atmosphere is conducive for violent 
acts carried out by the FPI. 
 
Another type of vigilante groups is a community-based 
vigilante group. Lombok Island is famous as a region 
with the biggest number of community-based vigilante 
groups in Indonesia (McDougall, 2007). Therefore, we 
can find sufficient literatures that discuss the emergence 
and existence of these groups. In the beginning, the 
formation of community-based vigilante groups is an 
initiative that emerged from particular villages. Then, the 
groups can attract more members from other villages, so 
they can from a solid organization. Kristiansen (2003) 
was the first scholar who wrote about the emergence of 
community-based vigilante groups in Lombok Post-
Suharto. He investigated the emergence of AMPHIBI 
which is the first and also the largest community based-
vigilante group in Lombok Island. AMPHIBI emerged 
as a response to economic recession, unemployment, 
and weakened state institution that hit Indonesia after 
the political transition in 1998 (Kristiansen, 2003). The 
existence of AMPHIBI is increasingly influential in the 
society because of the strengthening of local identity 
sentiment, elite political interest, and lack of law 
enforcement (Kristiansen, 2003).  
 
McDougall (2007) conducted a further investigation of the 
community-based vigilante groups. Based on empirical 
research, McDougall (2007) concluded that the existence 
of community-based vigilante groups such as AMPHIBI 
is related to competition between Islamic Leaders such as 
Tuan Guru with the ambitious noble and political design 
created by the ruling regime. Furthermore, McDougall 
(2007) also explained the economic networks, historical 
and cultural insights into crime, particularly about theft 
in Lombok. He was able to describe clearly the criminal 
operation in Lombok famous thief with a system of 
'ransom'. 
 
Tyson (2013) analyzed deeper about AMPHIBI in relation 
to the effects of decentralization. The role of AMPHIBI 
becomes very significant in political competition at the 
local level where the organizational network can be 
effectively used as an instrument for mobilizing political 
support. Telle (2015) conducted further research with a 
focus on political patronage to two community-based 
vigilante groups namely AMPHIBHI and Tiga Bersatu. 
Telle (2015) provided a conclusion that affirms the 
findings of Tyson (2013).  The leaders of AMPHIBI and 
Tiga Bersatu cooperated with politicians to secure their 
position in the district or regional government. The group 
leaders had a back channel to gain access to government 
projects. Previously, Telle’s research (2013) on AMPHIBI 
was quite different, because she was more focused on 
the theoretical debate conceptualizing the notion of 
'vigilante citizenship'. It means that AMPHIBI leaders 
can make their predatory actions such as the persecution 
of Hindus in Lombok, as a legitimacy action. They can 
manipulate the state to get respect and recognition so 
that access to funds and economic 'security-related 
projects' becomes available (Telle, 2013). 
 
However, most of the literature put the groups in 
antagonistic manner and as a predatory element in the 
local politics. I will therefore propose a different 
theoretical position in this essay. The group to be 
discussed here is Buru Jejak (which literally means: 
‘Tracker’) in Central Lombok. They cannot just simply 
be categorized as a predatory group because they are 
also a channel for ordinary people to fulfill their need 
for security when the state is incapable of doing so. 
Buru Jejak is used as an instrument of social change 
without relying on the state. The vigilante group studied 
in this essay is a form of social non-movement, which 
refers Asef Bayat’s literature. Asef Bayat defines social 
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non-movement as "the collective actions of noncollective 
actors; they embody the shared practices of large 
numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but-
similar activities trigger much social change. These 
practices are guided by an ideology or a recognizable 
leadership and organizations" (2010: 14). 
 
Asef Bayat formulated his theory based on cases that 
occurred in Cairo, Egypt. Vulnerable groups such as the 
urban poor and illegal immigrant attempt to reclaim 
rights that are not fulfilled by the state, such as access to 
clean water and electricity. This reclamation is 
conducted through illegal practices. As a ‘weak’ people, 
they are not just passive but also attempting to improve 
their quality of life through accessible and pragmatic 
action. However, this theory has limitations with regard 
to the cases being discussed here because of the 
differences in context between Cairo and Central 
Lombok. Asef Bayat’s studies were conducted in urban 
areas that tend to see the absence of influential or 
charismatic leaders. This is different from Central 
Lombok, which is a rural area, where a charismatic 
leader plays an important role in inspiring action. 
Furthermore, there is a cultural value that strengthens 
the leadership of certain figures. Lastly, Asef Bayat’s 
theory does not consider the presence of vigilante 
groups. It needs adjustment to be applicable to social 
non-movement theory in the case of Buru Jejak in 
Central Lombok.  
 
Therefore, to distinguish them from other vigilante 
groups, I define Buru Jejak as an informal security 
groups. This refers to the definition of informal security 
groups (ISGs) formulated by Robison, Wilson, and 
Meliala as "Organizations [that] provide (or impose) 
various forms of security and protection across a range 
of levels, largely outside the scope of the rule of law and 
the reach of formal regulation "(2008: 1). Furthermore, 
they identify several characteristics of informal security 
groups that are appropriate in examining Buru Jejak in 
Central Lombok. These characteristics include the fact 
that ISGs provide services when formal policing by the 
state is inadequate.  They, however, are often not 
immune from political interest, and can offer welfare 
functions by providing jobs for the unemployed.  They 
also offer particular value as a source for legitimacy 
(Robison, Wilson, & Meliala, 2008). 
 
Central Lombok: The Landscape of Crime. The political 
transition in 1998 was marked by the emergence of 
insecurity in almost all parts of Indonesia, including 
Lombok. The population of Lombok Island reaches 3.2 
million with the majority being ethnic Sasak representing 
92 percent of the total population (Telle, 2013). The 
number of criminal cases registered in the court of 
Lombok doubled from 1997 to 1998 (Kristiansen, 
2003). The state is assumed to no longer be able to 
satisfy the security needs of the community. Thus, a 
number of informal security groups began to appear, 
establishing themselves in various places in Lombok. 
The groups absorb approximately 25% of adult men as 
an active member (McDougall, 2007). The presence of 
informal security groups is attractive for the ordinary 
people because it coincides with the economic crisis and 
an increase in the number of criminal cases. Local 
governments and community leaders enthusiastically 
welcomed the presence of these groups as a new form of 
‘people power’ in its efforts to maintain the security of 
their respective regions (McDougall, 2007).  
 
The problem of insecurity and crime in Central Lombok 
is closely connected with the high rate of poverty. As a 
rural area, most of the inhabitants of Central Lombok 
are farmers. They are dependent on commodities such 
as livestock, maize, rice production, and tobacco 
(Tyson, 2013). From 2006 to 2010, literacy rate in 
central Lombok is lowest in the region (BPS Lombok 
Tengah, 2012). High levels of poverty are reflected as 
well in the human development index figures. West 
Nusa Tenggara Province is a province with the lowest 
human development index score. Central Lombok itself 
is a district with the lowest human development index in 
the West Nusa Tenggara Province administrative area. 
The human development index numbers of Central 
Lombok district only ranged from 59.7 to 62.57 from 
2008–2012 (BPS Lombok Tengah, 2013). 
 
Data on poverty is consistent with the high levels of 
crime and insecurity in Central Lombok. Based on data 
released by the Central Lombok Police about the 
criminality cases from 2006-2010, the three types of crime 
with the highest frequency are theft with qualification, 
theft with violence, and theft of a motorcycle. Theft 
with qualification means that the targets are animals - 
farm animals such as cattle, goats, and buffalo. This 
property is an important asset for the local people 
because most of them are farmers.  As can be seen in 
the Table 1 below, theft with qualification has the 
highest rate of frequency amongst all crimes in 2006 
with 85 cases and in 2007 with 118 cases. Based on this, 
it shows the reason why the presence of informal 
security groups such as Buru Jejak in Central Lombok 
became very popular. With this high criminal case, 
Lombok people try to seek their own way to resolve the 
problem. Informal Security groups become the 
accessible option rather than relying on the police 
officers, who are well known for their corrupt behavior. 
 
Moreover, the members of Buru Jejak are famous as 
well-trained people who master how to track farm 
animals. 
 
However, poverty is not the only factor that makes 
crime, especially theft, in Lombok especially very high. 
There are cultural values that influence the conception 
of thieves in the Lombok people. The Balinese kingdom  
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Table 1. Criminality Rate in Lombok Tengah District 2006-2010 
 
Types of Criminality 
Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Theft with qualification 85 118 38 52 151 
 
Motorcycle theft 26 103 22 35 252 
 
Violent theft 18 26 16 12 77 
 
Source: Central Lombok Police 
 
 
occupied Lombok in 1891. In the stories passed down 
from generation to generation, the occupation was always 
described as very cruel (interview with Academician, 
Lalu Subkhi, June 8, 2013). The people of Lombok 
were considered as the lowest group in the caste system. 
The Balinese Kingdom was very strong so it had the 
capability to engage in pitched battles and conventional 
warfare. Stealing the property of Balinese family in 
Lombok became popular as the thief became a popular 
folk hero for the Lombok people. They are known to 
have supernatural powers such as being able to disappear 
and impervious to stabbing by machete. 
 
Counter discourse toward the culture of 'noble thief' is 
emerging along with the presence of informal security 
groups. They offer a different concept of masculinity and 
other symbolic capitals that were previously attached to 
the 'noble thief'. Informal Security Groups like Buru 
Jejak are not only village thugs but are often seen to be 
equipped with a mystical invulnerability and supernatural 
powers. Adult men who become leaders are individuals 
who have advanced skills in martial arts, supernatural 
powers, and magic, often earning a high degree of respect.  
 
Buru Jejak: Brief Overview. Buru Jejak is an informal 
security group that was first established in Lombok 
Island. The group is named Buru Jejak because of their 
expertise in tracking stolen livestock. Actually, the 
existence of Buru Jejak dates back to 1994, but at the 
time they were an unofficial group of bounty hunters. 
Buru Jejak started to get public attention as an informal 
security group in 1998 when the local people were 
afraid of the increase crime and theft. The founder and 
leader is Hasan Basri (a fake name), who is more widely 
known as Amaq Hasan. Buru Jejak was established in 
Amaq Hasan’s house in the Bilelando village, Central 
Lombok (interview with Amaq Hasan, May 28, 2013). 
Currently, the house of Amaq Hasan has also become 
the headquarters of the Buru Jejak. Based on Buru Jejak 
records in 2007, there were 9,400 people spread across 
Central Lombok who have a membership card (interview 
with the secretary of Buru Jejak , June 2, 2013). 
 
The reason for the formation of Buru Jejak as an 
informal security group is quite personal for Amaq 
Hasan. A family member of Amaq Hasan had lost his 
livestock due to theft in 1998. Equipped with excellent 
tracking skills, Amaq Hasan and his friends was able to 
capture the thief. The thief was handed over to the police. 
However, a few days later Amaq Hasan saw the thief 
run free, apparently the thief had bribed his way to 
freedom. Disappointed with such corrupt police behavior, 
Amaq Hasan with relatives and friends sought to resolve 
criminal cases such as this in their own way (interview 
with Amaq Hasan, May 28, 2013). In addition to these 
personal reasons, the formation of Buru Jejak was also 
influenced by local cultural values. Amaq Hasan, as a 
member of the noble house of Praya, wanted to restore 
the dignity of the Sasak aristocracy. In the hunt 
operation, teams of Buru Jejak members would bring 
traditional weapons that are believed to have magical 
and supernatural powers. They use local tradition and 
culture as a basis for their moral supremacy. 
 
The primary members of Buru Jejak handling the 
investigation of theft consist of ex-criminals and thugs. 
Amaq Hasan claims that he was able to persuade many 
ex-thieves to switch jobs into 'legal' work by joining as 
a member of Buru Jejak (interview with Amaq Hasan, 
May 28, 2013). That is why they understand 
underground criminal operations and networks. After 
getting reports of cases of theft, the hunter team of Buru 
Jejak would spend a few days to investigate and pursue 
the perpetrators. If the thief is caught, they will be 
imprisoned and at times even killed immediately. 
 
The operational cost of Buru Jejak activities is taken 
from the treasury of the organization. This treasury is 
sourced from annual fees, registration fees, and 
insurance money from people who register to become a 
client of the organization. Each client will have to pay 
Rp 100,000, or approximately USD 9, every year and 
Rp 52,000, or approximately USD 4, as registration fee. 
In addition, there are insurance costs. Clients will ensure 
the most valuable properties such as cattle. Each cow is 
valued at Rp 250,000 or USD 24 per year. Thus, Buru 
Jejak will be responsible for the cow if the insured cattle 
are stolen (interview with hunter team of Buru Jejak, 
May 28, 2013). After registered as a client, each will get 
a sticker of Buru Jejak to put into home. These stickers 
serve as a marker that the person concerned is under the 
full protection of The Buru Jejak. 
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The symbol of Buru Jejak is similar to the Indonesian 
National Police symbol. This is because from the 
beginning of its formation, Buru Jejak was meant to 
help the police with their tasks. The performance of the 
police in maintaining security was disappointing 
(interview with Amaq Hasan, May 28, 2013). What is 
controversial about Buru Jejak is how they punish 
thieves, which include tactics such as arrest, torture, and 
even murder. Under the rules of community policing in 
Article 3 of Law No. 2/2002 and the Chief of the 
National Police Decree No. 737/X/2005, informal 
security groups only assist to provide security in their 
respective areas. Moreover, the rule does not provide 
the authority to sanction such institutions like the police. 
However, the police uses community policing as a 
reason to allow their practice, although they give 
sanctions towards the thieves (interview with the Chief 
of security intelligence Central Lombok Police, June 5, 
2013). Local police admitted that they had limited funds 
and personnel to conduct investigations into all cases of 
theft. Therefore, the presence of Buru Jejak actually 
assists police in their work (interview with the Chief of 
Security Police Intelligence Central Lombok, June 5, 
2013). It is apparent that the way Buru Jejak operates 
provides an example in how the lines between ‘legal 
and illegal’ have become blurred in regions such as 
Lombok. 
 
Informal security groups such as Buru Jejak ‘Kumpul’ 
slowly but surely obtain popularity and trust of the 
population. It because the provision of security services 
that they offer is affordable for the ordinary people who 
are mostly rural residents. The ordinary people acquire 
the services of security with only paying hundreds of 
thousands rupiah. It is still cheaper rather than they go 
to the police. Corruption and unofficial payment make 
the cost of security service from the police highly 
expensive. Therefore, it is not surprising if there is a 
popular local joke on how the people who lost their 
goats and report it to the police and then they lose a 
motorcycle. Many residents who use the informal 
security group services, such as Buru Jejak, show the 
distrust of residents toward the police. The police is a 
state institution that should fulfill public needs of 
security relatively not reliable. The police’s argument of 
their lack of funds and personnel cannot be the reason 
for the poor performance of the police in providing 
security. Combating corruption or unofficial payment 
inside the office is the real action that should be 
undertaken by the police to improve the institution 
integrity in the local society.  
 
Accessibility of security service from informal security 
group can be interpreted not only financially but also 
culturally. Most of the ordinary people in Central Lombok 
are farmers who do not have higher educational 
background. Therefore, they feel uncomfortable if they 
should come to the police and face the complicated 
bureaucratic procedures. They find it more convenient 
and familiar to take care of its security needs to Buru 
Jejak. They recognize some of Buru Jejak members 
personally because they also came from the same 
village. Moreover, the procedure does not require a 
complicated process such as in the police. Furthermore, 
Buru Jejak often uses traditional symbols that are close 
to the everyday life of ordinary people. Traditional 
symbols, such as sacred weapons or magical ability, are 
not only to familiarize the local populations but also to 
convince people about the capacity of the Buru Jejak 
members in securing property and resolve crime cases. 
Buru Jejak members are already known to have high 
supernatural powers or martial arts skills. 
 
Both economic and cultural accessibility makes informal 
security groups like Buru Jejak achieve trust and 
legitimacy from the local people. Crime is increasingly 
worrying, providing the ordinary people in Central 
Lombok with limited options. A form of legitimacy that 
given by the people to Buru Jejak can be seen from how 
the people are silently permissive toward the act of 
violence carried out by the group as long as their 
security needs are fulfilled. Concern over crime makes 
people see violent act of the group as 'reasonable' even 
'necessary' to eradicate crime. 
 
Buru Jejak and the Local Elites: Unholy Alliance. 
The presence of Buru Jejak as a provider of security 
services in Central Lombok is increasingly popular. The 
services of Buru Jejak have attracted ordinary people 
who are not able to access the security they need that 
should normally be provided by the state. They do not 
have the economic capital (money) and other symbolic 
capital to be served by the police maximally. However, 
the informal security groups are prone to abuse of 
power. For example, they can be used by local elites for 
their muscle power in order to mobilize voters in the 
local election and securing the head of the district's 
policies.  
 
The emergence of Buru Jejak as an informal security 
group cannot be separated from the figure of Lalu 
Wiraatmaja. He had served as the Central Lombok head 
of district from 2005 to 2010. When Amaq Hasan 
established Buru Jejak at in 1994, Lalu Wiraatmaja was 
the person whom Amaq first asked suggestions from. 
Lalu Wiraatmaja was a Parliament member of Central 
Lombok at that time. He was designated as a protector 
and advisor for the organization. He helped lobbying 
local elites, such as the head of district and local 
military commanders, in order to avoid barriers in the 
establishment and operation of Buru Jejak. 
 
Amaq Hasan and Lalu Wiraatmaja, became close as 
well because the two men are bound by similar notions 
of tradition. Lalu Wiraatmaja is a Sasak aristocrat 
successor of Praya house of nobles. Meanwhile, Amaq 
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Hasan is a descendant of the Praya house of noble 
palace guards. They both grew up together. In addition, 
as a noble successor of the Praya House of Nobles, Lalu 
Wiraatmaja is entitled to inheriting the land that became 
the territory of the House of Nobles. Amaq Hasan and 
their families were given the right to manage some of 
the land belonging to the house of Praya. Therefore, 
Amaq Hasan is known to have a strong sense of loyalty 
toward Lalu Wiraatmaja (interview with the secretary of 
Buru Jejak, June 2, 2013). 
 
Paired with Lalu Suprayitno, Lalu Wiraatmaja won direct 
election as district head in 2005 with 128,685 votes 
(Table 2). Lalu Wiraatmaja utilized its influence on 
Buru Jejak through Amaq Hasan in order to win the 
elections. This was evident from the day of candidates’ 
registration for the elections. When signing up to the 
Regional Election Commission (KPUD) Central Lombok 
on April 15, 2005, Lalu Wiraatmaja was escorted by 
thousands of members of Buru Jejak (Lombok Post, 
April 16, 2005). Based on the records of both the 
Regional Election Commission and the Election 
Monitoring Agency (Bawaslu), it is apparent that Lalu 
Wiraatmaja used Buru Jejak as one of his instruments to 
mobilize voters (interview with chief of Central 
Lombok Regional Election Commission, June 4, 2013). 
  
The community network of the Buru Jejak organization 
that includes even remote villages is an effective way to 
increase the number of supportive voters. They 
persuaded and even intimidated the public to vote for 
Lalu Wiraatmaja (interview with chief of Central 
Lombok Election Monitoring Agency, June 6, 2013). 
Members of Buru Jejak also organized events such a 
mass rallies in public spaces to invite the community to 
openly give declarations of support. Actions like this 
made the other candidates hesitate to compete with Lalu 
Wiraatmaja. In the end, Lalu Wiraatmaja won primarily 
 
Table 2. Central Lombok District Local Direct Election 
in 2005 
 
No. Name of The Candidates Vote 
1 Drs. H. Bushairi Najmuddin 
Drs. Ahmad Zihni Rifai 
 
92,731 
2 Drs. HL. Suhaimi 
Jazuli Azhar, SH. Msi 
 
92,656 
3 HL. Wiraatmaja 
HL. Suprayatno, SH, MBA, 
MM 
 
128,685 
4 Drs. HL. Puri, SS 
HL.Gede Wirasakti Amir 
Murni Lc 
 
62,282 
5 HL. Moch. Syamsir, SH 
Drs. Marinah 
23,485 
 
Source: Central Lombok Regional Election Commission 
in sub-districts known as a base of Buru Jejak members 
such as Pujud and Praya. 
 
In addition to the local elections, Buru Jejak was also 
used to secure the policies of district head, such as the 
case of the Lombok International Airport construction 
in Tanah Awu. People who lived in the airport area 
were against the airport construction because it was to 
be built in the location of their settlements. The airport 
construction area needed the clearing of 538 hectares and 
had to move the local inhabitants. The local inhabitants were 
evicted from their land, and they felt that the compensation 
provided by the government and Angkasa Pura Company, 
the contractor, was unjust and unsatisfactory. 
 
Together with SUAKA, a local NGO, and the Indonesian 
Farmer Union (SPI) Branch of Central Lombok, the locals 
clashed with police as part of a resistance action on 
September 18, 2005 (Tyson, 2013). As a response, Lalu 
Wiraatmaja deployed members of Buru Jejak together 
with the local police to dismiss the protesters. Amaq 
Hasan was caught carrying weapons while leading the 
Buru Jejak to disperse public rallies of Tanah Awu 
people in district head’s office on January 26, 2006 
(interview with an activist from Indonesian Farmer Union 
Central Lombok Branch, June 2, 2013). Members of Buru 
Jejak conducted intimidation and violence to suppress 
the people. The members of Buru Jejak attacked Amaq 
Hanan, one of the protesters leaders, at his home 
(interview with Amaq Hanan, June 5, 2013). 
 
However, Lalu Wiraatmaja failed to be the head of the 
district in the 2010 and 2015 direct local election. Twice 
Suhaili, who come from Tuan Guru family background, 
defeated him. Traditionally, Tuan Guru is the leader of a 
madrassa (Islamic boarding school). He is recognized 
by the people because of his high religious knowledge. 
Lalu Wiraatmaja can be defeated because he was 
unsuccessful to unite informal security groups in 
Central Lombok that previously supported him as in the 
2005 election. Lalu Wiraatmaja’s favoritism to Amaq 
Hasan creates jealousy among the leaders of informal 
security groups (Permana, 2015). Therefore, they 
moved the support to others candidates who most likely 
to bring more profits (Permana, 2015).  
 
Although Lalu Wiraatmaja failed to become the head of 
the district in 2010 and 2015, the existence of Buru 
Jejak remains influential in the community of Central 
Lombok. The rise of new informal security groups in 
Central Lombok did not reduce the prominence of Buru 
Jejak. The total amount of Buru Jejak membership is 
relatively still the biggest in Central Lombok. Leaders at 
the unit level continue to play a significant role in the 
village respectively. As the earliest informal security 
group in Central Lombok, there are still many residents 
who entrust the assets and property for security service. 
The candidates who run for legislative election or 
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village election still ask for support from leaders of 
Buru Jejak (Permana, 2015). It shows that the loss of 
Lalu Wiraatmaja in the 2010 election did not ower the 
prestige of Buru Jejak in society. Furthermore, elites 
who run in particular political events need members of 
informal security groups, such as Buru Jejak and others, 
to mobilize votes. The group serves as a vote broker for 
candidates who can provide benefits. 
 
Originally, informal security group was an initiative of 
the residents to make improvements in their life quality, 
especially for security needs. However, it turns out that 
their existence is susceptible to be used by the elites for 
the political machine. Their involvement as muscle 
power in electoral politics could give negative impacts. 
Ways of intimidation that they use to win a certain 
candidate should also be eradicated.   
 
Buru Jejak as Social Non-Movement. This essay 
opens with a local humorous quote that illustrates the 
limitations of the ordinary people of Central Lombok in 
accessing their rights to security. The rampant corruption 
of the police made the majority of the population, who 
are poor, unable to afford security services that should 
be provided free of charge by the state. Therefore, it 
becomes an anecdote: if someone’s valuable property is 
stolen, such as a goat, reporting the case to the police 
will require greater costs in the process. Thus, the 
option to use the services from informal security groups 
such as Buru Jejak is a rational and pragmatic choice for 
the local people. The fee to be paid to the Buru Jejak is 
cheaper and their work is more effective than the local 
police.  
 
The emergence of Buru Jejak and other informal 
security groups in Central Lombok was an initiative for 
social change movement in terms of the fulfillment of 
the right to security. When the ordinary people of 
Central Lombok could not rely on the state to provide 
ecurity, they chose their own way to improve their life 
quality. However, the actions that they chose were 
without mass protests and rally on the streets or 
revolution. They chose to conduct actual action to fulfill 
the security needs with do-it-your self-mechanism, 
although the mechanism tends to be illegal. A part of 
the everyday lives of Central Lombok ordinary people is 
establishing community-based security groups.  
 
The action of ordinary people for social change and 
improving the quality of life can be understood further 
using the concept social non-movement. Social non-
movement, conceptualized by Asef Bayat, is different 
from the mainstream definition of social movements. 
Mainstream definition of social movement, as Charles 
Tilly (2004) explain, consists of several elements such 
as ‘a sustained, organized public effort making 
collective claims on target authorities and employment 
of combinations from among the following forms of 
political action: creation of special-purpose associations 
and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, 
rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to 
and in public media, and pamphleteering’. In contrast, 
social non-movement is action-oriented, through quiet 
movement rather than audible, and it is also part of 
ordinary practices of everyday life. 
 
Asef Bayat, more or less, developed the concept of 
social non-movement from everyday forms of resistance 
that was formulated by James C. Scott (1985). The 
everyday form of resistance is popular in the agrarian 
and peasant studies. The concept became an influential 
discourse in the wider political studies. Everyday forms 
of resistance can be understood as a resistance 
movement of ordinary people or powerless group which 
have informal and passive nuance such as subtle sabotage, 
deception, false compliance, ignorance, slander, and 
dissimulation that involves little or no organization 
(Scott, 1986; Kerkvliet, 2009). The resistance refers to 
those of a more powerful class and social status or 
institutions, which are regard as unjust and unfair and 
even illegal (Kerkvliet, 2009). Everyday resistance is 
non-confrontational behavior, which becomes a part of 
people's daily activities. Therefore, everyday form 
resistances are considered as part of the normality of 
ordinary people’s everyday life. However, social non-
movement is different from the everyday forms of 
resistance. The struggle of ordinary people is not merely 
passive and defensive (Bayat, 1997). Social non-
movement captures initiatives of ordinary people who 
struggle for social change on their own actively or even 
offensively while remaining quiet. They do not act like 
they can change the political system or topple the local 
regime, but creatively reproductive power structure in 
order to obtain benefit as much as possible to improve 
the quality of life.  
 
In the context of Central Lombok case, ordinary people 
prefer to not always be in a powerless or marginal 
position in the security fulfillment. They creatively 
produce a system that utilizes the weakness of the state 
in providing the service. In fact, through informal 
security groups, ordinary people obtain the opportunity 
to take advantages of a local patronage network with the 
local elites, such as access to state resources. However, 
these groups are susceptible to be used by the local elite 
in the local power contestation. Furthermore, their 
activities are located within the blurred line, between 
legal and illegal. 
 
Social non-movement has two principles: (i) more 
action-oriented rather than ideologically driven, and 
quiet rather than audible; (ii) the movement is part of 
the everyday life practice (Bayat, 2010). The first 
principle can be seen in the case of Central Lombok; the 
inability of the state to meet the needs of security 
through police was responded not by protesting in a 
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massive scale or mass action. The Central Lombok 
people made an effort at social change to meet their own 
security needs through a silent act by establishing 
informal security groups. None of the demonstrations 
appeared to protest the police or local government in 
terms of their weakness to secure people’s properties. 
There are many residents registered either as an active 
member as well as a client. 
 
The second principle can be seen from the daily 
activities of Buru Jejak members. When there is no case 
of theft, Buru Jejak members in each village conduct 
neighborhood watch or patrol with other local residents. 
Every night they come together in a place built like 
guard post that is made from bamboo (berugak). Then, 
they would take turns for patrolling to houses of 
villagers to ensure the security. This kind of activity is 
part of the involvement of all members of the community 
in order to maintain security in their daily life.  
 
However, the people of Central Lombok use local 
cultural values as a source of legitimacy for their 
involvement in Buru Jejak. Thus, this is different with 
the conception of Asef Bayat, which presupposes that 
the social non-movement emerged with no ideological 
background. Buru Jejak is a way of Sasak ethnic 
populations that are affiliated with the Praya House of 
Nobles to increase their pride and dignity. By becoming 
a member of Buru Jejak, Sasak adult men gained 
symbolic capital, such as increased masculinity and 
supernatural power. They will often use sacred 
traditional weapons. Thus, the presence of Buru Jejak is 
also as part of an effort to maintain local traditions and 
culture. This local culture is what can be accessed and 
understood by the ordinary people of Central Lombok in 
their fight for security rights. This situation is in contrast 
to when they report to the police or to the courts. 
Besides not having enough money, they do not have the 
symbolic capital, such as the level of education, to 
understand the languages that are used in the legal 
institutions of the modern state. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
To sum up, the presence of informal security groups 
such as Buru Jejak is helpful in addressing the issue of 
security needs for people in Central Lombok. The 
presence of Buru Jejak as an informal security groups 
cannot simply be considered as predatory. They also act 
as an instrument of security that provides an accessible 
service for the population when the formal security 
apparatus of the state cannot provide optimal service. 
Buru Jejak is a way ordinary people improve their 
quality of life with regard to rights of security, resulting 
in a blurred line between legal and illegal activity. With 
that said, however, this group can be used by the local 
elites to achieve particular political interests. This group 
can also have a potentially destructive impact. Moreover, 
their use of violence puts them in the grey area between 
illegal and legal practices. Therefore, the state should be 
able to provide sufficient security service to citizens, so 
that the presence of such informal security group is no 
longer needed. The police must reform its institution 
completely by eliminating the practice of corruption and 
unofficial payment. In the end, it can restore the police 
integrity in the local society.  
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